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RISK ANALYSIS IN GEOTECHNICAL AND EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING:
STATE-OF-THE-ART AND PRACTICE FOR EMBANKMENT DAMS
SOAP 6
Dr. D. N. D. Hartford
Scientific Advisor: Safety and Risk Assessment
BC Hydro
ABSTRACT
The nature of risk analysis as applied to earthfill dams for the purpose of safety assessment is examined with particular reference to
the matter of demonstrating the scientific validity of risk constructs used to inform important dam safety decisions. The qualities and
attributes of what would be considered to be transparent, credible and defensible risk analyses for dam safety decision-making are
outlined. A conceptual approach to addressing the problem of quantifying internal erosion risk that combines critical state soil
mechanics theory and dynamic event tree analysis is proposed. Finally, an experiment aimed at assessing contemporary capability to
detect the “changes of state” is described.
PREAMBLE
I am honoured to once again present my perspective on the
State-of the Art and Practice of Risk Analysis for
Embankment Dams. This lecture also provides me with an
opportunity to reflect on developments in the domain over the
past forty five years and over the past fifteen in particular. It is
the last fifteen years that are of particular interest as risk
analysis in dam safety assessment has gained greater
acceptance, to the extent that dam safety programs are now
seen as somewhat lacking if they don’t have some element of
risk-based thinking explicitly identified as part of the safety
management process. Importantly, this lecture gives me the
opportunity to explore where, in our enthusiasm to establish
risk assessment in dam safety practice, we might not have got
things quite right.
One area of particular concern is the respective roles of
mathematics, scientific inference, and judgement, in the risk
analysis process. I have used the term “judgement” as opposed
to “engineering judgement”, because probability resides in the
domain of the philosophy of science and risk analysis of
engineered systems (including dams) pertains to analysis of
the mechanics of failure processes which pertain to physics
and not to engineering design and construction where
engineering judgement is essential. Mathematics which is
central to good engineering is also central to risk analysis,
although the types of mathematics may be different. Because
of the complex probabilistic nature of the mathematics of risk
analysis, one would expect that mathematics would be at the
core of risk analysis practice. Yet for some reason the
mathematics is often conspicuous in its absence, or reduced to
a trivial form. Central to my lecture is how do we address the
type of criticism of engineering judgments of probability
levelled by the distinguished Nobel physics laureate, Prof. R.
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P. Feynman which went “As Far as I can tell, ‘engineering
judgment’ means that they are going to just make up the
numbers!” (Feynman, 1988).
BACKGROUND
Earth dams and other earthen water retaining structures have
been essential elements of human development over the
millennia. In many respects the discoveries of how to
construct dams of different types in response to the social and
political demands for the management of water resources in
the public interest, have had some of the most profound
impacts on human development. Very recently in the history
of dams, soil mechanics has played a major role in the
engineering design, construction and safety assessment of
large dams. Sadly, dam failures can and do occur and it is an
unfortunate fact that dam failures have resulted in more
fatalities than the failure of any other peacetime industrial
artefact. Thus understanding failure modes of dams is
necessary to manage their safety.
Dam failure is terrifying; and the questions “is the dam safe?”;
“what will happen if the dam fails?”; and, “are the
consequences of dam failure manageable?” are central to the
management of existing dams and water retaining structures in
the modern context. However, despite the existence of earth
dams and water retaining structures over the millennia,
methods of answering these questions in transparent and
scientifically-based ways have only begun to emerge over the
past few years. How these questions are answered, and how
robust and defensible the answers are, depends in many
respects on whom you consult.
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Decisions to build dams and the safety standards to which
dams should perform are fundamentally matters of politics
even though traditionally engineers have assumed a
significant, even total responsibility for these matters.
Whether or not this assumption of this responsibility – usually
because the political process either expects it or because
engineers have assumed this responsibility within a political
vacuum – is not the subject of this paper, rather the paper
explores some of the dimensions required for engineers to be
properly equipped to enter into debate in the social-political
arena that increasingly mistrusts “experts” and demands
transparency and scientific validity.
Assessing the safety of a dam requires that the engineer make
inferences from incomplete and uncertain data. To do this the
engineer necessarily must hypothesise, and then draw
conclusions recognising that a hypothesis is a basis for
reasoning without any presumption of its truth. In many
instances, dam safety engineers are not dealing solely with
facts – the entire safety assessment process is inferential and
utilises inductive logic. Inductive logic pertains to arguments
that are not certain, and inductive logic analyses inductive
arguments (hypotheses) using probability.

should be of great concern particularly since internal erosion
has been the cause of approximately 48% of historic
embankment dam failures. Overtopping failures have been the
cause of approximately 48% of failures with all other failure
modes including seismic contributing just 4% of the total (the
figure for “other” goes up to 17% if tailings dams are included
(USSD, 1994)).
Concerning risk analysis as applied to dams, ICOLD Bulleting
130 (ICOLD, 2005) contains a reconnaissance of risk analysis
practices around the world. Further, I gave as complete an
account of risk analysis of dams under dynamic conditions as I
could in my State-of-the-Art and Practice lecture in 2001
(Hartford ibid); and there have not been any significant
fundamental discoveries in the soil mechanics of embankment
dams since then.

This State-of-the Art and Practice lecture attempts to focus on
unravelling the problem of how and how well these issues can
be answered. As such, and unlike my previous State-of-theArt and Practice lecture in 2001 (Hartford, 2001), I will not
deal with the specifics of how to apply State-of-the-Art or
State-of-the-Practice (if there is a difference) methods of risk
analysis to individual dams.
I do not propose to discuss the “State-of-the-Art and Practice”
in the analysis of the behaviour of earth dams under dynamic
and static loading conditions as others have already provided
comprehensive treatments of the “state-of-the-practice” in the
two domains of interest, seismic analysis of embankment
dams and internal erosion of dams under static loading
conditions.
Dr. W. F. Marcuson III and his colleagues
(Marcuson et. al, 2007) provided an exemplary account of the
state-of-the-practice in embankment dam analysis for seismic
conditions; and Professors Robin Fell (Fell et al., 2005) and
his colleagues have provided a comprehensive account of the
Geotechnical Engineering of Dams. Professors Fell and Fry
(Fell and Fry, 2007) have described what might be considered
to the State-of-the-Art of analysis of the propensity for internal
erosion, although, in terms of the above definitions this would
be state-of-the-practice.
Comparison of the state-of-the-practice in embankment dam
analysis for seismic conditions with the invited workshop
consensus view of the state-of-the-art of internal erosion
analysis as presented by Fell and Fry reveals a stark difference
between the “states” of the practice for the two failure modes.
The state of the art for the internal erosion failure mode is
extremely weak in comparison with that of the seismic failure
mode (which itself is hardly sophisticated). In fact, the stateof- the-art of internal erosion analysis appears lacking of any
soil mechanics equations! That there is such an imbalance
between the analytical capabilities for these two failure modes
SOAP 6

Figure 1. Embankment dam failure statistics
(approximate) (Foster et al, 1998)
Obviously, this last point is debatable as no doubt there are
researchers working at a fundamental level in the science of
soil mechanics who would claim otherwise, and I don’t want
to discount their work in any way. Notwithstanding all of this,
in practice the soil mechanics that underpins the analysis of
the performance of dams has not changed in any significant
way over the past 20 or more years. The lack of any soil
mechanics models and equations in the “State of the art of
assessing the likelihood of internal erosion of embankment
dams, water retaining structures and their foundations” (Fell
and Fry, ibid.) means that it is not possible to deal with the
problem of internal erosion risk analysis in a scientifically
meaningful way. There is other work in this domain e.g.
Sellmeijer and Koenders which provides a mathematical
model for piping under a dam (Koenders and Sellmeijer, 1992,
Sellmeijer and Koenders, 1991) and the work of Ojha et al.
(2001).
Against this background, my focus is on risk analysis
techniques as they apply in dam safety assessment and some
of the challenges that have yet to be overcome. This is
followed by an outline of a conceptual approach to addressing
the problem of quantifying internal erosion risk that combines
critical state soil mechanics theory and dynamic event tree
analysis.
Finally, an experiment aimed at assessing
2

contemporary capability to detect the “changes of state” is
described.
PART I
RISK ANALYSIS
THE NATURE OF RISK ANALYSIS
Risk analysis is one of two classic decision support models
that can be used to help structure and inform complex choices
under uncertainty, the second being “decision analysis”. Risk
analysis is the process of characterising the risk associated
with the system of interest and in some cases it can be
extended to include the identification and benefit assessment
of some risk management options. It is based on systems
analysis and probability, and it excludes the actual decision
phase, which requires risk evaluation and risk assessment
(Hartford and Baecher, 2004). While the text Risk and
Uncertainty in Dam Safety refers specifically to dams in the
title, many of the concepts, theoretical considerations and
methods apply across the domain of the built environment,
and beyond to engineered systems in general.
As explained in Risk and Uncertainty in Dam Safety, risk
analysis and decision analysis have some similarities and are
often complementary. Both risk analysis and decision analysis
rely on probability theory to model uncertainties, usually the
subjective or Bayesian degree of belief interpretation of
probability. In risk management, risk analysis and decision
analysis are often inter-related because a decision analysis
may include a risk analysis as one of its constituent parts, and
the design of a risk management plan may require decision
analysis support. The challenge for risk analysts is to
characterize potential failure problems before decision options
have been identified, and when there is no single decision
maker, or group of decision makers, who can provide
preference functions and degrees of belief. Yet, a correct and
complete model of uncertainties in the probabilistic risk
analysis phase is important if the results are to be used later
for decision support, especially when the number of systems
involved and the duration of their operations is unknown
(Paté-Cornell and Dillon, 2006). These considerations are
pertinent to dams and geotechnical structures in general,
especially when the consequences of a bad decision are
potentially catastrophic or where the effects of a decision have
lasting impact on the performance of the system.
These distinctions and interrelationships between risk analysis
and decision analysis; between decision support and risk
management; and particularly the risk characterisation
function of risk analysis are important because they are often
mixed in common usage. The words of risk analysis have
presented opportunities for confusion for many years (Kaplan,
1997) as they are used differently in different professions and
domains. In some cases, the term risk analysis is employed in
a way such that it includes risk assessment, risk management
and risk communication (e.g. OGTR, 2005). The diversity of
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use of the term “risk” ranges from “risk = probability” in the
healthcare industry to “risk = consequence” in the insurance
industry. In engineering, risk is taken as:
Risk = Probability x Consequence
The potential for misinterpretation and misunderstanding goes
far beyond the definition of the risk as the term probability,
which is fundamental to risk analysis means different things to
different people and it is very difficult to obtain precise
information as to what people mean when they use the term
probability. In the domain of geotechnical and earthquake
engineering, even the terms Bayesian probability, subjective
probability and degree of belief probability present problems.
For some, the term Bayesian does require the formal
application of Bayes Theorem, whereas others refer to a
Bayesian probability approach that does not require the actual
application of Bayes theorem (a dubious position, see Hacking
2001).
SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY
The matter of the scientific validity of the results of risk
analyses of dams has always been a contentious issue. The
suggestion that risk analyses of dams should be credible and
defensible (Hartford and Salmon, 1997), were met with
scepticism and even outright resistance. However, I was
simply drawing attention to the fact that there are increasing
demands for all types of risk assessment to be scientifically
based. Miss J. Bacon, the former Director general of the UK
Health and Safety Executive expressed the view that, “the
task of the risk regulator - and of the scientific and
engineering communities - is to reassert the concepts of
justified risk and of ‘safe enough’; to demonstrate the
effectiveness of good science and technology in providing
robust systems of risk management and control; and to make
transparent the process undertaken for arriving at scientific
judgements and engineering decisions” (Bacon, 1999).
In the same paper, Miss Bacon noted “20 years ago an
eminent engineer in the UK suggested that: Engineering is
the art of moulding materials that we do not wholly
understand into shapes we cannot precisely analyse, so as to
withstand forces we cannot really assess, in such a way that
the community at large has no reason to suspect the extent of
our ignorance.” This was accompanied by a clear warning by
this risk regulator: “I [J. Bacon] am afraid that 20 years on,
such black box mysticism in dealing with sources of risk is no
longer viable. The credibility of risk prevention and control is
at stake.”
This emphasis on scientific validity is not peculiar to the UK
Health and Safety Executive, as the scientific validity of risk
analyses in Europe is essentially taken as given. Recently, in
the United States, the Office of Management and Budget
introduced new guidelines for Federal Agencies performing
risk assessments (OMB, 2007).
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(Note, the Office of Management and Budget use the term
Risk Analysis to include Risk Assessment, Risk Management
and Risk Communication.)

Randomness concerns natural processes that are inherently
unpredictable. To describe something as random is to presume
that its occurrence can be described only probabilistically.

The memorandum which specifically states that the term
scientific applies to engineering (footnote 17) sets out a
number of “Principles for Risk Assessment”. The first of
these principles states: “Agencies should employ the best
reasonably obtainable scientific information to assess risks to
health, safety, and the environment.” There is a clearly stated
expectation that risk analyses should be based upon the best
available scientific methodologies, information, data, and
weight of the available scientific evidence. Principle 3 states:
“Judgments used in developing a risk assessment, such as
assumptions, defaults, and uncertainties, should be stated
explicitly. The rationale for these judgments and their
influence on the risk assessment should be articulated.”

Random (adjective). Date: 1565. 1. a: lacking a definite plan,
purpose, or pattern b: made, done, or chosen at random; 2. a:
relating to, having, or being elements or events with definite
probability of occurrence. b: being or relating to a set or to an
element of a set each of whose elements has equal probability
of occurrence (Merriam-Webster, 2000).

Regardless of the differences in risk analysis terminology,
such demands for scientific validity of risk analyses are real
and justified and should not come as a surprise. Those
involved in risk analysis of dams will need to demonstrate the
scientific validity of their practices to pass regulatory and
public scrutiny. How dam owners and their engineers respond
to this challenge could well be problematic for some,
particularly those who resisted and even continue to resist the
notions of transparency and scientific validity.
Precisely why requirements for demonstrating the scientific
validity of risk constructs in risk analyses for dams are
variously overlooked or discounted is not at all clear. The
Bayesian view of probability is central to risk analysis for dam
safety and an increasing number of philosophers and scientists
accept the Bayesian view that “scientific reasoning is
essentially reasoning in accordance with the formal principles
of probability” (Howson and Urbach, 1991). I have argued in
favour of credible and defensible probability assignment for
over 10 years, and this can be achieved by adhering to the
Bayesian approach.
PHILOSOPHICAL PRELIMINARIES
Although the concepts of probability and risk have been
known since the 14th century, they have not found widespread
use in geotechnical engineering practice until recently, and
then only to a limited extent. This might appear to be rather
strange given that uncertainty is such a dominant factor in
geotechnical engineering, but the practice has been to adopt
conservative designs to cater for all of the uncertainties.
However, it is a simple fact that the extent to which a
“conservative” solution actually covers all uncertainties and
eventualities remains unknown.
Uncertainty and randomness
It is necessary to make a clear distinction between randomness
and uncertainty.

The role of dice, patterns of the weather, occurrence of an
earthquake, and other such unpredictable occurrences have
been called aleatory by Hacking (1975) and others after the
Latin aleator, meaning “gambler” or “die caster.” This term is
now widely used in risk analysis, especially in applications
dealing with seismic hazard, nuclear safety, and severe storms.
The term probability, when applied to such random events, is
taken to mean the frequency of occurrence in a long or infinite
series of similar trials. This frequency is a property of nature,
independent of anyone’s knowledge of it. It is innate, and has
a “true” value. Two observers, given the same evidence, and
enough of it, should eventually converge to the same
numerical value for this frequency.
The term uncertainty means different things to different
people and it is difficult to find an unambiguous definition of
the term. At least since the 18th century and arguably much
earlier, the notion of uncertainty has concerned what we
know.
Uncertain (adjective). Date: 14th century. 1: Indefinite,
indeterminate 2: not certain to occur: Problematical 3: not
reliable: Untrustworthy 4 a: not known beyond doubt:
Dubious b: not having certain knowledge: Doubtful c: not
clearly identified or defined 5: not constant: Variable, Fitful
(Merriam-Webster, 2000).
Such unknown things have been called epistemic, after the
Greek, επιστηµη, meaning “knowledge." This term is now
widely used in risk analysis, to distinguish imperfect
knowledge from randomness
The notion of uncertainty is disconcerting to engineers and to
those they serve. To engineers, especially those grounded in
the philosophy of determinism, it perhaps implies a degree of
ignorance, something that is apparently unacceptable even if it
is true. It is disconcerting to those who accept engineering
services because they have become conditioned to expect that
the engineers they retain know what they are doing with their
money.
From its dictionary definition, uncertainty means a lack of
sureness or a lack of confidence about someone or something,
ranging from falling just short of complete sureness or
confidence, to an almost complete lack of conviction about an
outcome or result.
There appears to be three facets to uncertainty: Uncertainty
with respect to the world means that an outcome or result is
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unknown or not established and therefore in question.
Uncertainty with respect to a belief means that a conclusion is
not proven or is supported by questionable information.
Uncertainty with respect to a course of action means that a
plan is not determined or is undecided. The term uncertainty
has a variety of shades. Each of these express an aspect of
uncertainty that comes to play somewhere in risk analyses.
In modern practice, risk analysis usually incorporates
uncertainties of both the aleatory and epistemic types. That is,
the term uncertainty is used as an over-arching term that
includes randomness. The National Research Council (1996)
describes different types of uncertainty, using the following
terminology:
Aleatory uncertainty is attributed to inherent randomness,
natural variation, or chance outcomes in the physical world; in
principle, this uncertainty is irreducible. These uncertainties
may include things such as stream flows, assumed to be
random processes in time, and geotechnical properties of
levees, assumed to be random processes in space. Aleatory
uncertainty is sometimes called, random variability, stochastic
variability, objective uncertainty, or external uncertainty or
natural variability (NRC 2000).
Natural variability associated with the “inherent” randomness
of natural processes, manifesting as variability over time for
phenomena that take place at a single location (temporal
variability), or as variability over space for phenomena that
take place at different locations but at a single time (spatial
variability), or as variability over both time and space. Such
natural variability is approximated using mathematical
simplifications, or models. These models may or may not
provide a good fit to natural phenomena. In the best of cases,
they are close but only approximate fits.
Epistemic uncertainty is attributed to lack of data, lack of
knowledge about events and processes that limits our ability to
model the real world. Epistemic uncertainty is sometimes
called, subjective or internal uncertainty. Epistemic
uncertainties divide into two major sub-categories: model
uncertainty and parameter uncertainty. Model uncertainty has
to do with the degree to which a chosen mathematical model
accurately mimics reality; parameter uncertainty has to do
with the precision with which model parameters can be
estimated. The NRC panel called this, knowledge uncertainty.
Knowledge uncertainty is most commonly associated with
model and parameter uncertainty. Model uncertainty reflects
the inability of a model to precisely represent a system's true
behaviour, or our inability to identify the best model, or a
model that may be changing in time in poorly known ways
(e.g., flood-frequency curve changing because of changing
watershed). Parameter uncertainties result from an inability to
accurately assess parameter values from test or calibration
data, from limited numbers of observations, and from the
statistical imprecision attendant thereto. Parameter
uncertainties may also arise from data uncertainties, including
measurement errors, inconsistency of data, transcription
errors, and inadequate representativeness
SOAP 6

Probability
The term probability, when applied to imperfect knowledge, is
usually taken to mean the degree of belief in the occurrence of
an event or the truth of a proposition. In this sense, probability
is a property of the individual. We may or may not know what
the value of the probability is, but the probability in question
can be learned by self-interrogation. There is, by definition, no
“true” value of this probability. Probability is a mental state,
and therefore unique to the individual. Two observers, given
the same evidence, may arrive at different probabilities, and
neither be wrong. This is one of the dilemmas of probability;
one never knows the true answer. One expert might assign a
probability of 0.1 to the occurrence of an event and another
might assign a probability of 0.01 to the same event. The
occurrence or non-occurrence of the event does not negate
either of these expert’s probabilities.
While the term “degree of belief” is not without its own
difficulties, and perhaps the term “degree of confidence”
might be more useful, it is clear that in terms if the “belief”
interpretation of probability it is not quite right to refer to the
Probability of Failure of Dam X as something like:

pf = Ax10 − b / yr
Rather, it would be correct to claim that “the degree of
confidence” in the ability of a dam to survive various
conditions is:

C = (1 − pf )
∴ C = (1 − Ax10 −b ) / yr
In short, a dam, or any other structure for that matter does not
have a “probability of failure” as an intrinsic property.
I would suggest that much of the debate, and on some
occasions heated arguments, about the role of probability and
risk in engineering and in the safety assessment of dams in
particular could have been avoided by this simple. It is not as
though it wasn’t known in the mathematical and scientific
community that “probability doesn’t exist in the real world”,
it was; but it was not and still isn’t universally accepted. This
was particularly true when Casagrande first proposed the
concept of calculated risk in geotechnical engineering because
there were several great philosophers such as Sir Karl Popper
who held that probability should be objective.
Probability assignment
In general, probabilities are assigned to distinctly different
variables in the risk analysis, (1) chance event variables
associated with natural variability (also termed aleatory
uncertainties), and (2) state or condition variables associated
with knowledge uncertainties (also termed epistemic
uncertainties). Whether variables are chance variables or state
variables is an artefact of the model within which the
probabilities are assigned. Thus the assignment of
5

probabilities is inextricably linked to the model being used to
characterize the performance of the dam, its loading
conditions, and the consequences that follow dam failure.
The frequency interpretation of probability is well established
in engineering practice and the belief interpretation, which one
suspects has been used implicitly and often unsuspectingly in
engineering practice, is increasingly being used intentionally
in engineering. Recent demands for explanation and
transparency in dealing with uncertainty through risk analysis,
means that increasingly the belief interpretation is being used
explicitly.
In parallel to these alternative meanings for the concept of
probability are alternative approaches to the way inferences
are drawn from evidence, that is, from statistical data.
Frequentist statistical inference is a widely applied body of
doctrine comprising, among other things, estimator theory and
the theory of significance tests.
Classical frequentist inference evolved in an effort to create an
‘objective’ appraisal of scientific theories, and treats
probability as frequencies of random variations in the physical
world, for example, as the naturally occurring variations
among experimental results. Howson and Urbach (1991),
point out that the frequentist theory of estimation, “(…) has
two branches, known as point estimation and interval
estimation. Point estimation aims to select a specific number
as the so-called best estimate of a parameter; it is contrasted in
the literature with interval estimation, a method of locating the
parameter within a region and associating a certain degree of
‘confidence’ with the conclusion that is drawn”.
Inferences about degrees-of-belief, in contrast to frequentist
inference, are built upon Bayes’ Theorem. Bayes’ Theorem
describes the degree to which observed evidence should
logically change a degree of belief (i.e., a probability) held
before the evidence was observed, to a logically following
degree of belief after.
Degree-of-belief inference has sometimes been called,
“subjective probability,” but Kaplan and Garrick (1981) put
forward the view that the term is misleading, and that it has
caused confusion and controversy. They put forward the view
that the battle between the “frequentist school of thought” and
the “Bayesian school of thought”, has been due to a
misunderstanding. The root cause being the desire for
objective science on the part of the ‘frequentist school of
thought’, a view shared by scientists in general.

construct, the extent to which probability constructs are
founded in data and the extent to which a probability has been
constructed in terms of established logical and mathematical
principles.
However, the belief interpretation of probability does not
simply imply that, “a probability is what one believes it to be”.
As Orkin (2000) points out, “without essential mathematical
form, anyone can say anything”. Thus, while a loose
interpretation might be attractive from the perspective of
facilitating the easy generation of numbers, it has limitations
and inconsistencies if the belief is not correctly constructed.
The problems associated with such a limiting interpretation
can be overcome by adding additional constraints that
strengthen the interpretation of probability. The result of
adding such constraints is an interpretation of the form “a
probability is what the evidence, as correctly assembled in
terms of the necessary mathematical and scientific principles,
permits one to believe it to be as a basis for action”. It is this
combination of all of the information (ranging from objective
data through rational judgment to entirely subjective senses) in
a logically consistent way through mathematical procedures
that provides a probability construct with its essential
mathematical form.
Against this background, the interpretations of probability as
belief and probability as frequency are considered to be
complimentary with both interpretations being necessary
elements of probability theory as it applies to dam safety risk
analysis. The interpretations are complimentary and
scientifically valid when properly applied, and should be
applied to the appropriate extent. There is no question of the
two interpretations being mutually exclusive, or one being
superior in its totality to the other, because the two approaches
are complimentary, and depending on the situation, the use of
one interpretation may be more appropriate than the use of the
other. In this regard, the two interpretations are not necessarily
alternatives.
EXPERTS, OPINION, JUDGEMENT AND SCIENTIFIC
VALIDITY

Kaplan’s views are not unique, similar arguments concerning
the objective nature of the Bayesian approach have been put
forward by other experts in probability and risk, the works of
Howson and Urbach (ibid.) and Morgan and Henrion (1990)
being just two examples.

“Engineering judgment” is held at an elevated level of respect
amongst geotechnical engineers, and while engineers are
generally held in high esteem by the public, the same public
increasingly questions whether engineering judgment can be
relied on to answer questions of public safety.
The
geotechnical engineering community can no longer rely on the
paternalistic sentiment embedded in the notion of engineering
judgment - that professionals know best - because it is out of
fashion and unjustifiable in the modern context. In recent
years, US federal government agencies such as the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission have even discouraged the use of the
term engineering judgment in their deliberations.

Recently, Hacking (2001) presented the view that there are
two types of belief probability, the interpersonal/evidential
type, and the personal type. This distinction permits the
analyst to reveal the fundamental nature of each probability

Thus while engineering judgment is raised to transcendent
heights within the geotechnical community, it is often
questioned by policy makers and the public. Despite the
benefits provided to society by modern constructed facilities,
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adverse environmental consequences and other unfavourable
impacts of those same facilities seem to be more on people’s
minds.
Within the dam safety community (although not original to it)
there are at least two schools of thought on what constitutes
judgment. (1) One holds that judgment reflects a base of
knowledge held by a person or persons, and manifests in
quantitative estimates of probabilities or other parameters as a
reflection of intuition. (2) The other holds that judgment
reflects an analytical process of reasoning, and manifests in
quantitative estimates as a reflection of logic. These
contrasting views of judgment reflect an age-old rivalry
between the mathematical and the intuitive mind (Berlin and
Hardy 1980; Berlin et al. 1979); Pascal (1966) even thought
the two ways of thinking to be incompatible within the same
person. Nonetheless, each approach is supportable and
internally consistent, and each relates to the other, but they
differ in their practical implications.
Within the school of thought that holds judgment to reflect an
intuitive process, judgment is seen as based on the recognition
of patterns in the world from which correlates can be
identified. This is sometimes referred to as the “lens theory”
and is attributed to Brunswik’s (1952) research on perception
and cognition (Hammond 1996). Brunswik theorized that
people do not directly perceive the essence of an object or a
situation, but rather perceive a set of implicit cues about it
which may be ill defined. Such cues are statistically related in
a person’s mind, whether consciously or not, with the essential
aspects one is attempting to draw a judgment about, and these
statistical relationships are learned from experience.
Within the school of thought that holds judgment to reflect an
analytical process, judgment is seen as based on reasoning
from observations, known facts, and physical principles;
wherein, reasoning means to determine or conclude something
by logical thinking. Reasoning is similar to mathematical
argumentation, but with verbal statements and relationships
rather than symbolic ones. An important quality of the
reasoning approach to judgment, in the eyes of its proponents,
is the paper trail of evidence it leaves to justify conclusions
that are reached.
Within the normal enterprise of risk analysis, an opinion, in
contrast to a judgment, is a belief held with confidence but not
substantiated by positive knowledge, proof, or explicit
reasoning. This contrasts, and should not be confused with the
meaning of the term in the legal arena, where an opinion is a
formal statement by an adjudicative body of the legal reasons
and principles for a set of conclusions.
Coherence and correspondence
The philosophical world distinguishes between two types of
truth or judgments: coherence and correspondence (Hammond
1996). The coherence theory of judgment focuses on whether
an individual’s judgmental process is internally consistent.
The correspondence theory focuses on whether an individual’s
judgments have empirical accuracy.
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The cognitive basis of intuitive judgment is poorly understood.
Brunswik’s model, which has been the basis of later work by
Hammond (1996), and others–and which has been cited by
Parkin (2000), Vick (2002), and others, is based on perception,
specifically the perception of attributes which Brunswick
callecd, cues. Such cues are statistically related to objects and
situations based on experience. When faced with a new object
or situation, the individual perceives a relatively limited
number of cues (Brunswik speculates that the number seldom
exceeds seven) from among the almost limitless possibilities,
and from these draws conclusions. The cues tend to be
complex, thus they many not be interpreted in the same way
each time they are perceived, or they may be perceived
differently each time. Different people, presumably, perceive
and interpret cues in different ways, presumably place
different weights on them, and presumably combine cues in
different ways, and thus may come to different conclusions
about the same object or situation.
Hammond combined Brunswik’s model of cues and intuitive
judgment with reasoning and calculation to form cognitive
continuum theory. Cognitive continuum theory holds that
intuitive judgments should be evaluated by the
correspondence between the weighted average of the cues
perceived about an object or situation, on the one hand, and
the critical attributes of the real object or situation they reflect,
on the other. If these two correspond, then the judgment is said
to be valid. In contrast, reasoning or calculation should be
evaluated by the coherence of the model produced. If the parts
of the model form an internally consistent totality, then the
reasoning or calculation is said to be valid. The
correspondence of this logically sound model to physical
reality is of secondary importance.
Cognitive continuum theory further holds that people do not or cannot - simultaneously think in both correspondence mode
(intuitive judgment) and coherence mode (reasoning and
calculation), but rather flip back and forth between these two
cognitive processes. People form intuitive judgments, then
subject those judgments to reasoning and calculation, and then
take the results back into an intuitive correspondence mode,
and so on, and so on. Hammond calls this, “quasi-rational
cognition.” In solving a difficult problem, one might first look
to hunches, intuitive guesses, or premonitions, and then
subject whatever arises to analytical thought. When the
analysis becomes bogged down, one might go the other way
and seek hunches about the analysis. This is something akin to
Sir Karl Popper’s (1968) hypo-deductive view of the scientific
method, in which an hypothesis is developed intuitively, but
then tested deductively.
In practical applications, analytical cognition is both more
highly accurate on average than is intuitive judgment, yet
sometimes can be wildly inaccurate. This is unsurprising.
When underlying assumptions are more or less correct,
analytical cognition can be both accurate and precise; but
when those same assumptions are incorrect, the conclusions
based on analysis can be widely off. Large errors were
sometimes made in the analytical mode, but research suggests
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that they are less frequent than in the intuitive mode
(Hammond 1996).
The confidence that people, both professionals and the public,
place in a prediction appears to be related to the degree of
internal consistency that manifests in the arguments or model
underlying the prediction.
Parameter estimation
The whole area of obtaining quantitative estimates of
parameters which cannot readily be quantified through direct
measurement or other sampling techniques, has changed
dramatically since Casagrande’s time and even since Whitman
resurrected Casagrande’s concept (Whitman, 1984) or others
began to apply the concept in practice in the late 1980’s and
1990’s.
The introduction of probabilistic concepts for treating
uncertainty requires an engineer to exercise a form of
judgment which differs from the conventional professional
judgment that he (or she) may have developed during his or
her career through training and practical experience (Brown
and Aspinall, 2004). This alternative form of judgment, which
arises in all attempts at estimating probabilities, regardless of
the domain, is generically termed ‘expert judgment’, and
involves enumerating subjective probabilities that reflect an
expert’s degrees of belief. Typically in the practice of risk
analysis for dam safety (Nielsen et al., 1994, USBR, 1999,
Vick, 2002, Brown and Godson, 2004, URS, 2007) this
subjective element in assigning probabilities has often been
treated, in terms of a limited personal interpretation of
subjective probability, treated informally (that is without
formal consideration of coherence and correspondence, or
ignored altogether. However, requirements for scientific
validity and methodological advances such as those described
in Risk and Uncertainty in Dam Safety are bringing a more
rigorous form of eliciting judgment increasingly to the
forefront of risk analysis practices.
The first question that arises in expert judgement elicitation is
“How does one define an ‘expert’?”
Experts
Typically, experts have undergone rigorous intellectual
training. Experts can be distinguished from non experts by two
characteristics; specifically their substantive expertise, and
their normative expertise (Morgan and Henrion, ibid.):
• “Substantive expertise can be measured by how well a set
of assessments predicts the actual outcomes; a substantive
expert should on the average assign high probabilities to
those events that turn out to occur, and low ones to those
that do not.
• Normative expertise is measured through the process of
calibration. It is also known as reliability. An assessor is
said to be well calibrated if the assessed probability of
events corresponds with their empirical frequency of
occurrence. For example, for a large set of events to each
of which the assessor assigns a probability of 0.8, about
SOAP 6

80% should actually occur if the assessor is well
calibrated.
Scientific validity of expert judgements
Expert judgements in risk analyses can be demonstrated as
conforming to accepted scientific norms through the use of
elicitation schemes such as that developed by Professor R.
Cooke (Cooke, 1991), which is one of the most widely used
processes. Use of the level 3 and level 4 methodologies
developed by the Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee
in the United States (Budnitz et al., 1998) which is analogous
to Cooke’s method is an alternative. Cooke’s method is
particularly attractive as its basis replicates the formal
scientific method. One of its most valuable attributes is the
scope it provides for quantifying realistically the spread of
scientific or engineering uncertainty in relation to any
parameter of interest.
Cooke’s procedure is usually framed to elicit suitable lower
and upper percentile confidence estimates from the experts, as
well as a central or ‘best’ estimate value (which can be the
mode, mean or median, depending on the distributional
properties being sought). This aspect of the structured
elicitation procedure is especially important for those variables
for which adequate data do not exist for conventional
statistical analysis. This is where the need for precise
differentiation between engineering judgment and expert
judgment matters.
Here it is vitally important not to confuse ‘scientific validity’
(application of the scientific method) with ‘scientific proof’ as
they are distinctly different concepts. Many real life decisions
must be addressed before the scientific community can reach a
consensus, and this applies to dam safety decisions which are
fraught with uncertainty. However, even under conditions of
great uncertainty, the principles of scientific inference can be
applied.
The following basic principles, which were formulated as part
of a research project into models for expert opinion elicitation
carried out under the auspices of the Dutch Government
(Cooke, 1991.) are of particular value in risk analysis of dams.
These principles are:
Reproducibility: It must be possible for scientific peers to
review and if necessary reproduce all calculations. This
entails that the calculation models must be fully specified and
the ingredient data must be made available.
Accountability: The source of the expert subjective
probabilities must be identified (this is particularly true for
decision-making concerning the safety of the public).
Empirical Control: Expert probability estimates must, in
principle, be susceptible to empirical control.
Neutrality: The method for combining expert opinion should
encourage experts to state their true opinions.
Fairness: All experts are treated equally, prior to processing
the results of observations.
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One task for proponents of risk analysis for dams is to
demonstrate how these perfectly reasonable principles are
applied in their practices. From an analytical perspective,
conformance to these principles is particularly important as
they relate to the fundamental process of estimating
probabilities and probable states. Scientific theories can never
be conclusively verified, but, if a theory is in fact false, then in
principle it should be possible to conduct a reproducible
experiment to demonstrate that this is the case. This process is
fundamental to empirical control - it is the safeguard against
the argument that everybody’s subjective probabilities are
equally valid. Thus, the application of Cooke’s or an
equivalent method that replicates the formal scientific method
in eliciting subjective probabilities from suitably qualified
experts will meet the requirements for scientific validity.
TECHNIQUES OF RISK ANALYSIS
Event tree analysis
The event tree is a graphical construct that shows the logical
sequence of the occurrence of events in or states of a system.
Event trees offer the analyst the capability to construct a logic
model of a system that is visual and therefore is easy to view
and read, and that provides a qualitative and quantitative
insight to the system’s operations and reliability.

Figure 2. System states modelled in an event tree
This straightforward notion of binary change of state must be
modified for application to dams as the states will not always
be binary. With respect of event trees representing changes of
state, the general concepts are illustrated in Figure 3.
Importantly perhaps, the change of state concept provides us
with a clue as to how internal erosion risk might be quantified
in event tree analysis.

An event tree can be thought of as a fragility curve
representation of the system’s response to the loading. The
fragility curve is treated as primarily reflecting limited
knowledge of system behaviour, modelled as epistemic
uncertainty. Initiating events are brought into the start of the
event tree to cause the system to respond. Typically in event
tree analysis, initiating events are treated as naturally varying
phenomenon occurring randomly in time. Even though the
uncertainties associated with external initiating events may be
attributable to limited knowledge, in practice they are
normally modelled as due to natural or random variability
(i.e., as aleatory uncertainty). This implies annual probabilities
of events of given size occurring or being exceeded, as for
example, in flood frequency relations or earthquake recurrence
functions.
It is important to define what the event tree is intended to
represent as this determines the nature of the variables
represented in the tree. The meaning of the term “event”
should be clearly defined and understood as should the
description of system states. It will often be necessary to make
a clear distinction between the state of the system and the state
of the operating environment of the system as there are often
important interactions between the two which can be come
“mixed” in the event tree if sufficient care is not taken.
Originally, event trees were used to represent binary changes
of state of systems as illustrated in Figure 2.
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Figure 3. Generalised event tree representation of “change
of functional state”
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is an apparently straightforward
endeavour that finds widespread application in many
industries and businesses. It is an inductive type of analysis
that, unlike fault tree analysis, is not supported by an extensive
theoretical basis. ETA is the most widely used form of
analysis in risk analysis for dam safety, although the lack of
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theoretical basis means that the correctness of these constructs
is difficult if not impossible to determine at this time.
Fundamentally, creating an event tree model of a dam is a
knowledge-based endeavour. Different analysts will have
different ways of defining events, different ways of linking
events together, and different ways of estimating parameters
and assigning probabilities to events. All these things,
combined with inadequate data and poorly understood models,
mean that event trees and their numerical results are never
unique. An event tree reflects a belief structure about a dam,
about the natural environment within which the dam resides,
and about the natural and human processes that affect dam
performance.
The uncertainties that enter an event tree analysis–both in the
way events are structured in the tree and in the way numerical
values of probability are assigned to branches have mostly to
do with limitations in knowledge, not with random processes,
although for modelling convenience they may be represented
either or both as natural variations (aleatory uncertainties) and
knowledge uncertainties (epistemic uncertainties). This is true
about the external environmental forces acting on a dam,
about internal response of the dam to those forces, and about
the estimation of properties and parameter values that enter the
calculations.
While this does not imply that ETA is not useful in safety
assessment of dams, it does limit the extent to which it can be
relied on in an absolute sense in decision-making.

FTA can play a particularly valuable role in forensic analysis
of failures of systems, including dam failures. It can also be
extremely valuable in mining case histories of failures, be it of
dams or other engineered systems. In particular, FTA
provides a means of demonstrating the validity of
“explanations” for dam failures. The extensive theoretical
basis that exists for fault tree analysis, together with the fact
that FTA does not suffer from the inability to demonstrate the
correctness of tree structure (as is the case with event trees),
renders FTA a vastly superior means of explaining failures.
Any difficulties that arise in explaining case histories will be
immediately revealed by the logical rules of fault tree
construction. The fundamental elements of Fault Tree
construction are illustrated in Figure 4.
System Failure
(Top Event)

Define Events and their
Sequences that lead to
System Failure

Logically connect the
Sequences of Events
using AND. OR, or
other Logic Gates

Trace each Sequence down to a Basic
Cause (Basic Event), denoted by
circles or diamonds, for which failure
rate data exists. This represents the
limit of resolution of the event tree.

Top Event
description and
reference codes

FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is one of the techniques available to
the engineer conducting a reliability or safety analysis for a
dam. It is a technique whose theoretical foundation is welldeveloped and that has been applied extensively in reliability
and safety assessments for a wide range of engineered systems
such as missile launch systems, chemical process facilities,
nuclear power plants, dams, control systems and computers. In
addition, the software and the databases available for
conducting a FTA are sophisticated and add significantly to
the efficiency of performing a risk analysis.

Denote all events above
the gates and all events
with more basic causes
below the gates by a
rectangle containing a
description of the event
ann the reference codes

OR

Event description
and reference codes

AND

AND

Event description
and reference codes

Event description
and reference codes

Basic
event

Basic
event

Basic
event

AND

Basic
event

The fault tree is a graphical construct that shows the logical
interaction among the elements of a system whose failure
individually or in combination could contribute to the
occurrence of a defined undesired event such as a system
failure. Fault trees offer the analyst the capability to construct
a logic model of a system that is visual and therefore is easy to
view and read, and that provides a qualitative and quantitative
insight to the system’s operations and reliability. FTA is a
deductive analysis, in which the analyst reasons what can lead
to the occurrence of a specified undesired event. In a top-down
manner, a FTA works from the general to the specific. One of
the early steps in a FTA is to specify a particular but general
undesired event, such as failure of a system. The analysis then
proceeds to determine what the specific causes or modes of
system failure are.
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undeveloped
event

Figure 4. Essential elements of Fault Tree Construction
This does not look overly difficult, so why is it that FTA is not
the analytical method of choice in the forensic analysis of
failures of geotechnical structures? I would suggest that the
problem is not with the method of fault tree analysis per se,
rather its demands for both data and logical reasoning between
claim and evidence appear to be at odds with the traditions of
engineering judgement in geotechnical engineering practice.
One of the most significant problems that arises in
constructing fault trees of dam failures is the lack of
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information about the failure because the evidence is literally
swept away by the dam breach flood. Unfortunately, any
inability to construct a fault tree of a dam failure means that
any account of the failure will be incomplete and therefore not
necessarily reliable. However, the inability to construct a
complete fault tree is no reason not to attempt to do the best
that one can because it is the only way to determine the extent
to which any account of the failure can be relied on in
informing analyses, judgements and decisions.

PART II
INTERNAL EROSION RISK ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
The ability to mechanically model failure mechanisms for
dams in general remains very weak, and is unlikely to improve
in the foreseeable future as research into the physics of failure
mechanisms is extremely limited. From Figure 1, it is clear
that internal erosion is worth of significant attention, and
while it has received some attention, spearheaded in recent
years by Professor Robin Fell at the University of New South
Wales, much work remains to be done to develop appropriate
mechanical models of the internal erosion process that can be
cast in mathematical form.
Most approaches to assessing the propensity for earth dams to
fail by internal erosion are now based on two design criteria;
specifically filter criteria and criteria for internal stability of
the core material. However, it is not at all clear that failure to
meet certain filter and internal stability criteria means that the
dam in question has a propensity to fail as a result of internal
erosion.
This is a manifestation of a more general problem in dam
safety as many dams do not meet modern safety criteria yet
they appear to perform quite satisfactorily. On the other hand,
conformance to these filter and stability criteria in design and
material selection does not guarantee that the propensity for
failure by internal erosion is eliminated because there is
presently no way of knowing that the as-constructed dam
actually strictly conforms to the design criteria. Segregation
during handling and placement are natural phenomena that
must be considered in any safety assessment of a dam. Dam
owners and their engineers face complex questions, the
solutions to which are not found in design rules, when trying
to determine the propensity of earth dams to fail by internal
erosion.
Semi-empiricism dominates the various approaches to
analysing the propensity of dams to undergo internal erosion.
I say semi-empiricism because in most cases, it is not possible
to demonstrate that the methods used conform to the
“principle of empiricism”.
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“Probability of failure by internal erosion”
The notion of expressing an annual probability of failure of
earth dams as a result of the internal erosion failure mode has
been discussed for over 20 years. The quantification of
internal erosion risks based on annualised probabilities
presents particular problems because it is not clear what it
means to express the probability of failure as an annualized
rate. The problem arises because the driving force for internal
erosion is reservoir level, without which there would be no
water pressure against the upstream face of a dam, no internal
pore pressure gradients, no seepage, and consequently no
internal erosion. However, it is not the fluctuation of reservoir
level through time that causes internal erosion; a constant high
reservoir would just as likely, or even more likely, lead to
internal erosion.
The uncertainties inherent to the analysis of internal erosion in
a fill dam have somewhat to do with frequencies, and
somewhat to do with knowledge uncertainties. On the first
count, many models of piping start with the random presence
of a “flaw.” This flaw can be one of design or one of
construction. It is often taken to occur randomly in space
within the dam. Thus, the flaw is partly an epistemic
uncertainty (does a flaw exist?), and partly an aleatory
uncertainty (if so, where?). On the second count, the process
of internal erosion, even given a flaw, is poorly understood.
There are significant limitations to the understanding of the
physics of internal erosion, and thus to the models and
material properties that apply. These have little to do with
randomness and almost nothing to do with frequencies in time.
From a risk point of view, two things are uncertain: first, will
a particular dam under particular load conditions fail by
internal erosion if left forever to do so, and second, if the
answer to the first question is, yes, then over what time period
does this failure unfold? The probability that the dam will fail
by piping in a given year, t0, is the product of an absolute
probability, the probability that it can fail by piping at all, and
of a time-dependent probability of how long the process will
take (Figure 5).
All these uncertainties may be epistemic, and yet they may
lead to “annualized” probabilities having to do with
uncertainties over how long the process takes to complete.
These annualized probabilities (i.e., the derivatives of the
cumulative curve) change with time, rising slowly from zero,
cresting at the most likely time to failure (presuming a failure
occurs at all), then falling off again. The asymptote of the
cumulative probability is the absolute probability that piping
failure occurs at all, which may be less than 1.0.
The extent to which uncertainty dominates many dam safety
decisions is often used as a reason for not pursuing risk
analysis of dams. This is unfortunate and grossly erroneous as
the same theoretical and scientific principles apply regardless
of how great the uncertainty. A decision problem with a little
uncertainty must be dealt with in the same fundamental way as
one with a great deal of uncertainty. The only difference will
be the extent to which the results will be uncertain. The above
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text demonstrates that we understand the issues and how they
should be considered in analysis, but not much more and
Figure 5 illustrates the form of the analytical result.
The ability to characterize internal erosion risks will not
improve until an understanding of the physics of internal
erosion improves. This is not a risk analysis issue, it is a
mechanics issue. In the mean time, the best that can be done is
to try to understand the nature of time-dependency in
describing the internal erosion risk (and risks similar to it, in
this sense).

Probability of piping failure

The loads driving a potential internal erosion failure (i.e.,
reservoir levels) may or may not have a frequency aspect to
them, but if they do, it can be ignored. The process of internal
erosion depends on physics and material values about which
there is limited knowledge and thus considerable uncertainty,
but internal erosion failure does not occur instantaneously. It
is a time-dependent physical process.

probability of piping "eventually"
cumulative probability
of piping failure
annual
probabilities of
piping failure

equiliration,
saturation,
etc.

Time

Figure 5: Probability of failure by internal erosion
(Hartford and Baecher, 2004)
Against this background, it is clear that the notion of the
annualized probability of failure by internal erosion is
problematic. This means that establishing numerical criteria
for internal erosion risk assessment is not the straightforward
matter that the contemporary literature might suggest.
The internal erosion failure mode is just one of a general set of
problems faced by dam owners that arises from the general
uncertainties in the design, construction and performance of
dams. It is a complex area where dam owners necessarily
should hold somewhat different degrees of confidence in the
functional performance of the dam than the designers and
constructors of the dam. This is because the designers
working in their individual engineering disciplines should be
confident with their designs and, with proper quality control
are entitled to assume that their colleagues have “got their
parts right”, and that the constructor “has got everything
right”, whereas the dam owner cannot assume perfection.
Rather, it is the extent to which the design and construction
are not quite perfect with respect to the design assumptions
and their validity that should be of concern to dam owners.
The increasing use of probabilistic risk analysis in dam
engineering has led to a realization that many of the
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approaches for modelling and analyzing failure processes for
dams are inadequate. The event tree is one modelling
technique that has been used in attempts to model dam failure
processes. That is, there are event trees of the type wherein
the “events” may be described, but the probabilities associated
with those events are not readily estimated from existing
understanding of the physics of the processes and the
knowledge of the dam. As a result, estimates of probability of
internal erosion are highly subjective (that is of the mind) even
though the process of internal erosion is entirely physical and
in principle measurable. This has led to the observation that
the profession needs to develop models that are more helpful
in analyzing actual mechanisms of failure rather than focusing
on comparison to design standards. Internal erosion is one of
the mechanisms of failure is one such failure mode where
significant improvements in scientific knowledge are required.
Failures due to internal erosion are not easily modelled, and
even if they can be modelled approximately, the estimation of
risk presents at least a significant a challenge. Different
workers in the field of internal erosion risk analysis have
developed event tree structures that are slightly different
variations of the same construct. However, developing wellstructured event trees to model internal erosion is difficult, in
part because the mechanics of the process is poorly understood
and therefore difficult to represent, and in part because the
nodes of an event tree represent transitions from one system
state to one or more new states. Typically, for event tree
models of functional states, outcomes of precursor events are
binary, Functional or Not Functional (Success/Failure,
Yes/No). Correctly accounting for the timing of the events is
a significant issue in event tree analysis, which is more
amenable to representation of instantaneous state transitions
rather than time dependent changes in functional state. The
failure logic sequence might actually change depending on the
rate at which interdependent “changes in states” in the systems
and its sub-systems take place.
In the case of internal erosion, the “system state” changes
from “fully functional” to “completely failed” in a gradual or
even sporadic way. Precisely what “the system” is, needs to
be carefully defined before change in system state can be
defined, and this is not an easy task. For example, the system
to be modelled in the event tree could just be the filter, or just
the core, or the core and filter as interdependent sub-systems,
or the core, filter and drains as interdependent sub-systems.
Then the definition of what the physical “change of state” of
“the system” is and the time at which the “change of state”
occurs are particularly important if internal erosion is to be
modelled using event tree techniques.
Not withstanding the facts that failures due to internal erosion
are not easily modelled, and that developing well-structured
event trees is difficult, all safety assessments of earth and rock
fill dams need to address internal erosion. Risk analysis
provides the only available means of expressing what is
known and what is uncertain in a rational way. That an
internal erosion risk analysis might be dominated by
knowledge uncertainties is simply a fact that must be dealt
with. However, the preponderance of uncertainty is not a
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reason for not attempting a coherent, well-structured risk
analysis.
Recent work has determined that the notion of utilising the
historic frequency of dam failures that are due to internal
erosion, while intuitive and clearly applicable to populations
of dams, is problematic with respect to individual dams. This
is not the only method of estimating the probability of failure
by internal erosion that appears to have fallen from favour.
The methods for quantifying internal erosion risk using what
might be loosely termed as subjective Bayesian prior
probabilities and Kent Charts that emerged in the 1980’s and
1990’s appear to be diminishing in the literature and are not
mentioned anywhere in Internal Erosion of Dams and their
Foundations (Fell and Fry, ibid.).
These observations suggest that despite valiant efforts and
significant investment, the apparently straightforward method
of quantifying the probability of failure by internal erosion
using event tree analysis and the subjective probability
interpretation as encoded in Kent Charts. A radically different,
soil mechanics-based approach appears to be the next frontier
in dealing with this difficult, and thus far irresolvable,
problem.
EVENT TREE MODELLING OF INTERNAL EROSION
RISKS
Event tree modelling of internal erosion risks (e.g. Whitman,
1984) began to emerge in practice in the early to mid 1990’s.
However, the engineering and scientific communities have not
been able to accept these methods as being appropriate and
valid risk analysis constructs. This lack of general acceptance
is an important factor to be taken into consideration by dam
owners dealing with internal erosion.
Typically, the event tree models of internal erosion that have
emerged over the past fifteen years are of the form illustrated
in Figure 6, which is subtly different from the “functional
state” concepts of Figure 2. Refer to Hartford and Baecher
(2004), pages 208 – 213, for an account of the early evolution
of event tree analysis of internal erosion.

Flaw

Piping
Starts

Exit
Forms

Tunnel
Forms

Breach

Figure 6. Published internal erosion risk analysis models
(Hartford and Baecher, 2004.)
The process illustrated in the influence diagram in Figure 6 is
a more specific version of the more generic deterioration
process form proposed by the researchers at the University of
New South Wales (UNSW) (Fell et al., ibid) (Figure 7). The
UNSW 4-step generic process is based on the generic
deterioration process that applies generally to engineered and
natural systems, and is not specific to internal erosion. The
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published models referenced by Hartford and Baecher is
readily represented in the UNSW model (Figure 8).

Figure 7. UNSW model of internal erosion (Fell et al., ibid)
The “detection” and “intervention” steps, which are
sometimes included in contemporary risk analysis practices
are not internal states of the “dam/reservoir” system and
should normally be exclude from the risk analysis process.
Rather, these interventions are external to the dam and are
more correctly associated with risk management measures.

Figure 8. Contemporary internal erosion model
Any intervention must necessarily result in an “imposed
change in the system” that is not in any way related to the
process of internal erosion. From a risk management
perspective, it is better to construct the “base-case” event tree
without consideration of detection and intervention as it is not
possible to determine the probabilities of success if one does
not know the seriousness of the problem at the time of
detection or the effectiveness of any subsequent intervention.
There are also good reasons to suspect that the inclusion of
detection and intervention nodes in an event tree will result in
an overly optimistic view of the level of risk.
In terms if the “State-of-the-Art” of ETA, the state of the
system should be fully defined by a logic tree prior to the
initiation of the failure mode in order to ensure that the event
tree is restricted to being a representation of the system
response. This approach is distinctly different to the event tree
analysis practices for dams that emerged in the 1990’s where
pre-existing system states were often represented at nodes
within the event tree.
At the outset, the state of the system prior to the occurrence of
the initiating event must be defined. This means that the
complete set of states that the system normally operates in, for
example reservoir elevation, operating temperature, etc. are
defined prior to constructing the event tree. It is also important
that the knowledge (epistemic) uncertainties concerning the
pre-existing state be represented if they influence the analysis
of the system response. Logic trees provide a useful way of
representing system states where each end branch of the logic
tree describes a pre-existing system state.
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When it is necessary to consider more than one precursor
system state and/or uncertainty in the precursor state, it is
necessary to use several event trees and to condition each
event tree for each failure mode by all possible system states.
Correctly accounting for the timing of the events is a
significant issue in event tree analysis, which is more
amenable to representation of instantaneous state transitions
rather than time dependent changes in functional state. The
analyst should be aware that, as is the case in some nuclear
power applications, the failure logic sequence might change
depending on the rate at which interdependent changes in
states take place.
The use of event trees in modelling internal erosion failures,
presents a number of difficult questions, including the absence
of scientifically verified models of the start and continuation
of internal erosion. It also suffers a lack of good information
about the as-constructed internal condition of most dams. The
failure of a dam by internal erosion during first filling,
illustrates another aspect of the problem of characterising
internal erosion risks as in most cases (some flood control
dams being an exception) first filling of a dam is not
necessarily a random event, and thus is not necessarily
modelled as an annualized, random (aleatory) variable. Thus,
the initiating event for internal erosion is usually associated
with flaws or deterioration. While event tree analysis is
especially well suited to representing the potential
consequences of natural hazards; it is less well suited for
dealing with internal initiating events with time-dependent
failure mechanisms.

The functional elements of the dam that are critical to the
analysis of the probability of failure by internal erosion are;
Core; Filter; and Drain (Figure 10).

Figure 10. Spatial model of earth fill dam
The spatial model can be transformed to a functional model as
illustrated in Figure 11. The core-filter-drain subsystem is
represented generically in the event tree shown in Figure 9 as
sub-systems 1, 2 and 3. Thus, if one can determine the
functional states of the core, the filter and the drain, in Figure
11 then they can be represented directly in event tree form.

Against this background, and with reference to Figure 2 and 3,
I would like to propose a generalised “change of state”
approach to event tree construction for internal erosion, where
the time dependent functional state of the “core-filter-drain”
sub-system that controls internal erosion can be represented
(Figure 9).

Figure 11. Functional model of internal flow control

Figure 9. Time-dependent functional state framework for
internal erosion event trees
The “change of state’ concept is distinctly different from the
contemporary models illustrated in Figure 6 through 8 and as
described in Internal Erosion of Dams and their Foundations
(Fell and Fry, ibid.).
This “change of functional state” approach is a generalisation
of the “functional process” model that provides a means of
decomposing the functional state into time based steps. It is
aimed at overcoming the limitations of the conventional
approach to event tree analysis of this important failure
mechanism.
SOAP 6

While the sub-systems in the event tree have been arranged in
terms of their relative spatial positions, the states of each subsystem are matters of knowledge and therefore the
uncertainties and associated probabilities are epistemic in
nature. Here I propose that the sub-tree for the three element
(core- filter-drain) sub-system can be considered as a
graphical representation of statements about the joint
probabilities of variables that can be modelled as random at
time “ti” , then, from the total probability theorem, the order of
the events is not a consideration. Thus the spatial arrangement
of the event tree nodes for time “ti” does not imply that the
changes of state of the core-filter-drain occur sequentially.
By focusing event trees for internal erosion on the timedependent functional state of the critical defensive
components of the dam, I suggest that it may be possible to
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transfer these heuristics and biases from event tree
construction to the mechanics of internal erosion (Figure 12).

Figure 12. “Functional state” approach to event tree construction for internal erosion
Ideally, to characterise the functional state one must have
details of the fundamental properties of the dam and the
physical manner in which internal flow of seepage water is
controlled over time. To characterise the functional state, one
would conceivably determine fundamental soil properties of
the core, filter and drain such as density, void ratio/specific
volume, permeability, friction angle etc.
If these properties are known, then it would appear reasonable
to apply the theory of critical state soil mechanics as a means
of characterising the “physical state” of the key elements of
the dam. Once the physical state is characterised, its time
dependent functional state could be expected to follow directly
from consideration of the relationship between flow control
capacity and the specific volume and permeability of the soil.
While I do not consider that determination of the physical
state of the interior of the core, filter and drain of a dam will
be straightforward, I do consider that research efforts in this
direction, such as cross-hole seismic tomography, and other
methods of physical state determination such as temperature
and resistivity methods is worthwhile.

SOAP 6

The soil mechanics of the internal erosion problem
By reasoning from first principles, the problem of internal
erosion is an effective stress problem because particle
transportation (internal erosion) occurs when the tractive
forces of the seepage water on the soil particles overcomes the
frictional resistance that holds individual particles in the soil
matrix. Also by reasoning from first principles, the movement
of particles of a unit volume of soil results in a change in the
void ratio (and therefore specific volume). This change in
specific volume is a “change in state” making the Critical
State Soil Mechanics (CSSM) family of models a suitable
choice for analysis of the problem.
Given that internal erosion is an effective stress problem
where the important parameters pertain to the state of stress as
determined by (p’, q, u) and the tractive forces that the flowing
water applies to the soil particles, it seems that the relationship
between the state of stress and the pore pressure would be an
important factor in dealing with the problem of internal
erosion risk analysis. The theory of Critical State Soil
Mechanics (CSSM) (Schofield and Worth, 1968) can be used
to calculate pore pressures in laboratory tests and in the field.
Since internal erosion involves a change in dry density as fines
are lost, that can be represented in terms of a “change in
state”, and because this change in state can be related to
specific volume v, a fundamental soil property, it appears that
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it would be worth exploring if critical state soil mechanics
theory, coupled with a dynamic change in state event tree
analysis might provide a rational means of dealing with the
problem of internal erosion risk analysis for dams.
The only obvious problem at the outset of this exploration is
that the type of many soil types that dams are constructed from
do not conform to the stress-strain and deformation
predictions of theoretical models such as the Cam-clay model.
Such a problem would typically be a “show-stopper” in a
practical sense and practicing engineers have long been able to
reject these theoretical models as too idealised to be of
practical value. I took a different view because there is
nothing fundamentally wrong with the CSSM concept or its
theoretical foundations, and it has been applied to certain soils
encountered in engineering practice.
The tri-axial test is a good place to start to explore the
relationship between (p’, q, u). It also gives an opportunity to
explore the differences between the behaviour of real soils in
the tri-axial test and the CSSM Cam-clay and modified-Cam
clay theoretical model predictions.
Although the conditions under which internal erosion of dams
occurs is overall a “drained” condition, un-drained tri-axial
tests on soils used in the cores of dams provide a useful
starting point for a theoretical investigation. Whether or not
the process of internal erosion at its early stages involves
transitions from un-drained conditions to drained conditions
back to un-drained conditions will not be discussed here,
rather it will suffice to note that the understanding of the
behaviour of soils used in dam construction under un-drained
conditions is a necessary element of a comprehensive
understanding of how soils behave in engineered structures
such as dams.
In un-drained tri-axial tests on saturated soil specimens, the
excess pore pressure generated is made up of two components:
one component due to the response of the soil to the shearing
process represented by ∆q, the change in shear stress; the
second component due to the change in mean total stress ∆p
applied to the specimen (Figure 13):

Figure 13. Relationship between (p’,q,u) for well-graded
soils in the tri-axial test
While this might challenge some of the tenets of the CSSM
family of models and other models, it will suffice to note that
the soil remains in compression until it approaches and then
sharply transitions to a more or less constant (p,’‐q)
relationship (approaching the critical state).
From the experimental observations of the pore pressure
response of tri-axial tests on two quite different engineering
soils with similar well-graded particle size distributions
(Figure 14), I observed a linear relationship between generated
pore pressure and mobilised friction over the portion of the
effective stress path where p’ is decreasing that is of the form:

q
u
= K …(Eq. 2)
p oʹ
pʹ
where K is a constant for a particular soil (and can be derived
from the tri-axial test data). To ensure that this observation
was not simply an artefact of my testing procedure and the
soils involved, I examined the results of similar tests carried
out by others ranging from clay to sand (Figure 15).

∆u = α∆q + ∆p …(Eq.1)
As mentioned previously, many soils used in engineering
practice do not exhibit the behaviour of theoretical CSSM
models, with many soils showing both a compressive
behaviour at very small strains and a dilative behaviour at
larger strains during the test.

Figure 14. Relationship between generated pore pressure
and mobilised friction from un-drained tri-axial tests on
two well graded soils with different origins and other
properties
SOAP 6
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Figure 15. Relationship between generated pore pressure
and mobilised friction from un-drained tri-axial tests on
clay, sand and silt with different origins and other
properties
These results indicate that the linear relationship between
mobilised friction and pore water pressure under un-drained
conditions was not simply an artefact of the soils that I was
testing or the way that they were being tested and suggested
that a more detailed theoretical treatment would be
worthwhile. Since the clay soil shown in Figure 15 can be
successfully modelled in the CSSM framework, it seemed that
perhaps this observation might open up the opportunity to
explore one of the missing links between theoretical soils and
the behaviour of soils used in dam engineering practice.
In any un-drained tri-axial test starting at an isotropic pressure
(p=p’=po’), the following relationship holds:

q
u = p o ʹ + − pʹ
3
This equation can be combined with (Eq. 2) giving the
equation of the un-drained effective stress path.

q
pʹ − pʹ 2 − Kqp o ʹ + p o ʹ pʹ = 0 …(Eq. 3)
3
Equation (3) can be factorised as follows:

q
− pʹ − p o ʹ ( 3K − 1))( pʹ − 3Kp o ʹ ) = p o ʹ 2 3 k ( 3K − 1)
3
…(Eq. 4)
Equation 4 is now in the standard from for the equation of a
hyperbola with asymptotes:

and
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q
= pʹ+ poʹ ( 3K − 1)
3
pʹ = 3Kp o ʹ

Thus, the un-drained effective stress path is part of a
hyperbola passing through the points (po’,0), and by inspection
(0,0). It should be noted that po’ has the role of “normalising”,
the effective stress path in the sense that the basic geometric
shape of the curve is the same for different values of po’. Thus
far, there has been no reliance on CSSM. Rather, on the basis
of experimental observations and reasoning mathematically
from first principles, it has been possible to determine the
shape of the un-drained effective stress path of saturated
engineering soils under conditions of compression in the triaxial test. The conditions of the test are such that a soil mass
transitions from stable state to an unstable state in (p’, q)
space. In general, and in terms of CSSM theory, the state of
the soil mass is represented in (p’, q, v) space (as noted above,
v is the specific volume).
The above equations can now be introduced into the CSSM
framework. The equation of the stable state boundary surface
(SSBS) can now be obtained by associating the intersection of
the hyperbola with the pʹ axis (i.e. the point po’, 0) with the
corresponding point on the isotropic normal consolidation line
(NCL).

v o = N − λp o ʹ …(Eq. 5)
where λ is the slope of the isotropic NCL in a (v, lnp’)plot
and N is the value of v when po’ = 1 kPa. Equation (5) can now
be used to eliminate po’, from (4), setting q/p’ = η after a little
manipulation we obtain:

q
v o = N − λ ln( 1 − Kη ) − λ ln( pʹ − )
3
Since vo can take on any value, we can drop the subscript to
obtain the SSBS equation for the hyperbolic Cam clay model:

q
v = N − λ ln( 1 − Kη ) − λ ln( pʹ − ) …(Eq. 6)
3
This SSBS equation can be compared with the corresponding
Cam clay and modified Cam clay SSBS equations (Britto and
Gunn, 1987).
Cam Clay SSBS.

vλ = Γ + ( λ − κ )(1 −

η
)
Μ

Modified Cam Clay SSBS.

v λ = Γ + ( λ − κ ){ln( 2) − ln( 1 + (

η 2
) )}
Μ

The relevant CSSM soil constants are:
Γ:- specific volume of soil at the Critical State for p’ = 1.0 kPa
λ, and κ:- are the slopes of the compression and swelling lines
in isotropic consolidation tests
Μ:- the Critical State friction constant
17

The equation of the yield locus for hyperbolic Cam-clay can
be obtained by taking the intersection of the elastic κ-line
equation with the SSBS. If pc’ is the pre-consolidation
pressure which specified the size of the yield locus, then the
value of v corresponding to this pre-consolidation pressure on
the isotropic NCL is given by:

v c = N − λp c ʹ

vκ = vc + κ ln pc ʹ and,
vκ = v + κ ln pʹ (see Figure. 16)
Manipulating these last three equations to eliminate vκ and vc:

pcʹ …(Eq. 7)
)
pʹ

v is now eliminated from (6) and (7) and after some
manipulation the equation of the yield locus for hyperbolic
Cam-clay is obtained.

q=

κ
⎡
pʹ 1− λ ⎤
) ⎥
p c ʹ ⎢1 − (
pcʹ
⎣⎢
⎦⎥

⎡ pcʹ 1 pcʹ κ ⎤
)λ ⎥
)− (
⎢ K(
3
p
ʹ
p
ʹ
⎢⎣
⎥⎦

Λ = 1−

κ
λ

The solution of this quadratic equation yields:

In addition the standard relations for the κ-line are

v = N − λ ln pcʹ+ κ ln(

yield locus where the tangent is horizontal. This is achieved by
differentiating Eq. 8 and setting the resulting expression for
dq/dp’ to zero. This leads to a quadratic equation in (pcs’/pc’)Λ
where:

…(Eq. 8)

Λ

⎛ p cs ⎞
3K(1 + Λ ) + (1 − Λ ) ± 9K 2 (1 + Λ ) 2 + (1 − Λ ) 2 − 6K(1 + Λ2 )
⎜
⎟ =
⎜p ⎟
2
⎝ c ⎠

…(Eq. 9)
From which the ratio (pcs’/pc’) (see Figure 17) can be obtained.
Substituting back into Eq. 8, the value of q at the critical state
is obtained and hence Μ = q/p’.
At this point, a complete specification of the response of this
model material to any implied loading in the tri-axial test as all
of the basic equations of the hyperbolic Cam-clay model have
been provided. There is no reason that this basic model cannot
be extended to cover all conditions to which Cam clay and
modified-Cam clay have been applied. Since, the hyperbolic
Cam clay model provides a good fit to the pore pressure
response in the tri-axial test for diverse natural soil types,
some of which are used in the construction of dams,
hyperbolic Cam-clay provides a potential model for predicting
soil behaviour where the change of state is “change in v” and
where the total stress state is constant.

Figure 17. Yield locus for hyperbolic Cam clay
Figure 16. Generalised consolidation characteristics of
soils
The form of the yield locus is given in Figure 17. Importantly,
throughout this derivation of the yield locus it has not been
necessary to assume or know the value of the critical state
friction parameter Μ. However, Μ can be calculated from the
soil parameters already calculated because to ensure the zero
dilatancy condition the critical state line must intersect the
SOAP 6

Thus, it is possible that hyperbolic Cam-clay might provide a
theoretical soil mechanics framework to examine the problem
of “change in state” associated with internal erosion of dams.
If it were possible to determine v at various locations within
the core of a dam, then by re-arranging the above equations,
perhaps it might be possible to determine the proximity of unit
elements of core soil within a dam relative to the core’s Stable
State Boundary Surface. If this were possible, and if it were
possible to measure in some way “change in specific volume”
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with time, then the idea of risk analysis of the internal erosion
failure mode might become a reality. Interestingly, Popielski
et al. (2002) have proposed that the Modified Cam Clay
Model provides an analytical framework for the problem and
have performed finite element modelling of the problem
within the CSSM theoretical framework.

PART III
DETECTION OF CHANGES IN STATE
The final part of my paper outlines a field experiment aimed at
determining contemporary capability to monitor the seepage
through the core of a dam from the surface and to indirectly
detect these “changes in ‘specific volume’ state”. Other
methods of testing such as cross-hole seismic tomography can
also be used to detect changes in density through changes in
cross-hole velocities.
At the outset, I referred to the inferential nature of dam safety
assessment where the engineer is required to take incomplete
and uncertain data and draw conclusions as to the performance
of the dam up to that point in time. The engineer is also
expected to forecast the performance of the dam for the
foreseeable future. As mentioned at the outset, all of this
involves hypothesising and, in the case of dams, often little in
the way of hypothesis testing as it is often at a minimum
unwise to embark on tests that cannot be terminated without
doing any harm. Hypothesising from direct evidence is
difficulty enough, doing so from indirect evidence is even
more difficult and the complexities should not be underestimated. This experiment is at the extreme of indirect
hypothesising in dam performance analysis.
Typically, measurements of earth dam performance are done
very indirectly. For example, the functional effectiveness of
the seepage control functionality of the core might be measure
at the downstream end of the drain (several hundred metres
from the core), or even more indirectly through the response
of piezometers in the downstream shell and or drain. Surface
measurements of “properties at depth” such as Ground
Penetrating Radar (GPR), Resistivity, and Self Potential (SP)
are amongst the most indirect monitoring methods available.
The questions that arise are, “what are the signals from these
monitoring instruments telling us?” and “what are they not
telling us?” about the “changes in state” of the dam.
These are not usual problems in science, as the statements of
“what the signals are/are not telling us” are in the form of
hypotheses, and are dealt with in terms of hypothesis testing.
The idea of conducting “blind tests” and “double blind tests”
to test hypotheses is common in the scientific method, with the
view to determining of the hypothesis can be falsified. These
tests are essentially mandatory and taken for granted in the
sciences. However, such tests are rarely conducted in civil
engineering outside the laboratory and it is extremely difficult,
even impossible to carry out on full scale structures such as
dams.
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BLIND TEST OF SEEPAGE MONITORING CAPABILITY
If one accepts the hypothesis that under conditions of constant
hydraulic head, changes in seepage volume are indicative of a
“change in state” within the dam, then monitoring of seepage
within the body of the dam should be of considerable value.
The only reliable way to determine the meaning of the signals
from these monitoring methods is to test the method in a
controlled way under the full spectrum of conditions where the
method might be used. The following describes just one such
test with the view to illustrating what must be done to gain
confidence in inferences from dam monitoring instruments.
Geo-electrical and temperature profiling methods of seepage
detection in earth dams emerged as potentially promising noninvasive methods of monitoring leakage in through cores in
earth dams in the 1990’s. During the late 1990’s and early
2000’s, significant research work on application of these
methods to earth dams was carried out in Canada, Sweden and
the United States. While not directly related to detection of
the “change in specific volume state” that is of specific
interest, an increase in seepage volume is indirectly indicative
of “change in state” and internal erosion.

The test dam
EBL Kompetanse (EBL), the Norwegian Electricity Industry
Association conducted a major research investigation into the
stability and breaching of rockfill dams in 2002 - 2005. This
involved constructing and testing to failure a number of 5m 6m high, 40m long zoned rockfill dams. This was a very
ambitious project that led to very valuable and significant
improvements in the scientific knowledge of rockfill dam
stability, including overtopping erosion failure mechanisms
and the internal erosion mechanism. This important EBL
initiative was also incorporated in the European Union’s
IMPACT project that was investigating Extreme Flood
Processes and Uncertainty.
Exploratory discussions concerning the possibility of adding a
“blind test” of emergent Resistivity, SP and Temperature
monitoring methods to the existing testing programme were
held with EBL’s representatives. These discussions were
sufficiently fruitful to permit BC Hydro, ELFORSK, the
research branch of the Swedish Electricity Industry and EBL
Kompetanse, as represented by Statkraft Grøner (now Sweco
Grøner) and advised by Professor Kaare Høeg, to agree to
proceed with a “blind test” of these emerging seepage
monitoring methods for earth dams.
The “blind test” concept
The objective of the “blind test project” was to simulate the
outward manifestations of internal erosion by building “one or
more zones of relatively high leakage” into the core of a zoned
earth/rockfill dam, and ask a specialist in these emerging
detection technologies to find it (or them)! Put simply, we
were challenging the technology and its proponents to
demonstrate its scientific credentials and to demonstrate that it
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is not simply “high tech water-divining”! Of course, one has to
also account for the complications of nature which make it
impossible to build a dam precisely in accordance with the
design!
While the proposed project was solely motivated by scientific
inquiry, it became clear that pursuit of such inquiry involved
serious consideration of many aspects of dam ownership and
operation including; complex ownership arrangements;
financial and environmental risk management and risk transfer
arrangements; design and construction challenges. Some went
far beyond “good practice” considerations with questions like
“you want me to design what!?”, and reactions like “you have
to be crazy to try and build a “defective dam!”; on top of all of
the usual complexities and challenges of dam ownership and
operation.
For the blind test to succeed, and over and above all of the
considerations involved in dam design and construction, we
needed;
o A dam designed and built such that it would leak, as if
undergoing internal erosion, in realistic and measurable
way without failing;
o Have zones of seepage that would provide a fair but
strong challenge to the technology;
o To ensure that the locations of the defects remained
unknown to everyone except those involved in the design
and construction of the dam.

The basic design was modified to incorporate zones of high
seepage through the core. A total of three zones with high
seepage characteristics were hidden in the dam. As is clear
from the measured seepage in the seepage measuring weir, the
seepage flows closely follow the reservoir elevation. Needless
to say, the weather was not fully co-operative and it was
necessary to account for the effects of the periods of rain.
Overall, we succeeded in realistically simulating many of the
conditions that we are normally faced with in dam surveillance
including; the age-old problem that those interpreting the
monitoring data normally lacking much of the information that
they would like to have about the design and construction of
existing dams; the influence of weather effects; construction
anomalies; short periods to take measurements; and,
interpretation difficulties due to uncertainty and necessarily
incomplete data sets. From the perspective of the “blind test”,
the dam leaked perfectly (Figure 19). Full details of the blind
test
are
provided
in
the
ELFORSK
report
DAMMSÄKERHET, Internal Erosion Detection at the
Røsvatn Test Site. (Johansson et al., 2005).

The test dam
The basic design of the dam was:

Central moraine core (fines > 25%; dmax<60mm) constructed
in layers with a 4 ton vibratory roller.
A: Downstream rock fill support (0-500mm, d10>10mm)
B: Upstream rock fill support (300-400mm)
Figure 18. Cross section of original test dam
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Figure 19. Seepage through the test dam

Outcome
The test provided important corroboration of the value of
temperature measurement methods in seepage monitoring
detection. It provided encouraging results concerning the
value of resistivity methods, especially during initial
saturation of the core of the dam. While the results for selfpotential were less encouraging, they were not negative
suggesting that further research might be beneficial in
assisting arriving at a conclusion as to the role of the selfpotential method in seepage monitoring of dams.

Photo 1. Construction of “hidden defects”
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From the perspective of a dam owner, the results indicate that
increased reliance on temperature measurement methods in
practice appear warranted. The prospects of the use of
resistivity methods for long term monitoring remain
promising, although more work on calibration is warranted.
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The weight of evidence to support heavy reliance on selfpotential methods remains low.
The importance of constructing realistic dams to calibrate
“change in state” monitoring capability is now recognised and
is achievable. Full scale calibration tests can obviously be
supported by complementary small scale laboratory studies.
CONCLUSIONS
The safety assessment of dams involves the engineer taking
incomplete and uncertain data and drawing conclusions as to
the performance of the dam up to that point in time and for the
foreseeable future. The entire process is inferential requiring
the use of inductive logic. Inductive logic pertains to
arguments that are not certain, and inductive logic analyses
inductive arguments (hypotheses) using probability. It is
simply impossible to be certain that a dam is “safe” in an
absolute sense.
The scientific understanding of the inductive process as is
required for dam safety assessment has changed dramatically
since Casagrande first introduced the notion or calculated risk
in geotechnical engineering and since it emerged in the
practices. We now know that risk analysis for dams involves
a combination of philosophy of science (reasoning under
uncertainty), probabilistic mathematics, natural hazard
analysis, soil mechanics, and, dam performance data
collection, interpretation and analysis. We also know that the
type of expert judgement utilised in risk analysis for dams is
distinctly different to the “engineering judgement” used
commonly in geotechnical engineering.
Together the recent exposition of the philosophical and
scientific nature of probability and risk as they apply in dam
safety assessment together with the explicit demands for
scientific validity has exposed some significant gaps between
the contemporary capability to characterise the risk associated
with earth dams, and the regulatory, public and legal
expectations. The public, political and regulatory expectations
concerning the logic and scientific validity of safety claims
and the transparency of the process of arriving at these claims
is a matter that dam owner, their engineers, dam safety
regulators and the profession must address. To do so will
require involvement of experts from different domains outside
geotechnical engineering, and engineering in general.
The matter of scientific validity of risk analyses in the safety
assessment of dams is not a matter of argument about
“subjective” and “objective” per se when it comes to “belieftype probability” as such arguments are little more than mudslinging. Rather, and while “belief-type” probability is central
to the safety assessment process, there are many variations
belief-type or “Bayesian” probability between two extremes;
the “personal type” and “logical type”; and since in theory
apparently, there are 46,656 ways to be a Bayesian (Hacking,
2001). Therefore it is necessary for the analyst to be explicit
where in this spectrum a specific statement of belief
probability lies. Any policy-maker, regulator of member of
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the public is obviously entitled to know where in this spectrum
any probability that they are presented with lies! However,
Bayes’ Theorem is the unifying construct across all belief-type
probability and it is central to applications of personal
probability as it provides the logical basis for individuals to
update their personal beliefs as new information becomes
available. Importantly, Bayes rule doesn’t help “Bayesians”
to come to an initial position about their “belief probabilities”,
it just enables them to change their minds in a logical way as
new information becomes available.
Despite strenuous efforts, the use of semi-empirical design
rules in the analysis of risks associated with dams remains
unsatisfactory and there is no reason to expect that it these
design rules will ever provide a satisfactory means of
analysing internal erosion or other failure modes, as they are
aimed at conservatively avoiding failure states. The only
thing that compliance with design rules can provide us with is
some degree of comfort that the dam should perform
satisfactorily, and conversely, failure to comply with design
rules should create a corresponding degree of discomfort. The
best that can be done using these semi-empirical rules in risk
analysis for dam safety at present is a verbal statement of
perceived relative likelihood - qualitative “degrees of belief” whatever that means. Suggestions that these senses can be
transformed into quantitative probabilities by means of Kent
Charts that are meaningful and with attendant indicia of
reliability are misplaced and obsolete.
I have proposed that the Critical State Soil Mechanics
framework that utilises a hyperbolic Stable State Boundary
Surface may provide a suitable approach to developing a soil
mechanics solution to the problem of internal erosion. I have
also indicated the nature of the field testing required to
validate inferences from dam performance monitoring data.
Finally, I do not see this new position as being at odds with
what Casagrande proposed for risk analysis for dams. After
all, it was Casagrande who discovered the concept of
“shearing at constant volume” as subsequently formalised in
the Critical State family of models, and it was also Casagrande
who proposed that calculated risk had an important role to
play in geotechnical practice.
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